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COMMENTS
It is apparent from the language of the Ball case and succeed-
ing decisions that the Missouri courts have, with the aid of the
statute, in effect applied the gift theory since in each case it is
the donor's intent which is the subject of inquiry. If the Missouri
cases have been correctly decided on the theory of gift rather
than the theory of contract,27 then it follows that the issue as to
the parol evidence rule in these joint deposit cases is a spurious
one in Missouri.
In the light of this analysis it would seem that the Kansas
City Court of Appeals properly admitted parol evidence in the
Watts case. When a similar case is presented to the Supreme
Court, it is believed that the rule of the Watts case should be
affirmed.; -
RALPH K. SOEBBING
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION-INSTALLATION OF ELEVATORS
IN BUILDING TAXABLE UNDER STATE SALES TAX - EFFECT OF
TITLE RETENTION CLAUSE AND DESIGNATION OF ELEVATORS AS
PERSONAL PROPERTY.-Relator-Otis Elevator Company brought
certiorari against the State Auditor of Missouri in the circuit
court to review the assessment by the auditor of a 2 per cent
sales tax levied under Sections 11407 (b) (g) and 11408 Revised
Statutes of Missouri, on intrastate sales of tangible personal
property. The trial court quashed the Auditor's- finding and he
appealed to the Supreme Court, where in an opinion in Division
2, the trial court's judgment was affirmed in part and reversed
27. "The right of a codepositor to funds deposited by the owner thereof
in an account in the name of the owner and the codepositor, has, in several
states, been upheld on the theory that under the contract between the depos-
itors and the bank, the codepositor is entitled to the deposit on the death
of the original owner of the funds deposited. It seems clear, however, that
in such case there must be an intention on the part of the original owner
of the funds to make a gift to the other joint depositor. Even assuming the
existence of a third party beneficiary contract, the depositor other than the
one originally owning the money is the donee of a property interest.
"The contract may supply the formalities necessary to render a gift
effective. And it may be evidence of intent to make a gift. But it cannot
in reason conclusively show an intent to make a gift so as to preclude
showing that the deposit was made in this form for some other purpose."
7 AM. JUR. BANKS §436.
28. The Missouri Supreme Court in Gordon v. Erickson et al., 356 Mo.
272, 201 S.W.2d 404 (1947) held that the evidence was insufficient to
defeat the survivor's rights, but is it clearly implied that evidence is
admissible to show the donor's true intent. The statute apparently was
not considered.
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in part. Later, on motion of the court, the cause was transferred
to the court en bane, where the same opinion was again adopted.
Respondent-Elevator Company filed a motion for rehearing, ask-
ing for a clarification of the opinion without reargument. A
unanimous second opinion, in conformity with the first, was
then substituted.1
Respondent is a foreign corporation which designs, constructs,
and installs elevators under three types of contracts: (1) con-
tracts with contractors or building owners, by which respondent
agrees to place the elevator in the building in its completed form,
i.e., all labor and materials are furnished by respondent; (2) the
same type of contracts for the reconstruction or repair of ele-
vators; (3) mere oral contracts covering minor repairs and the
furnishing of small parts for elevators. The evidence in the
case showed that the materials for the class 1 and 2 contracts
constituted about 70 per cent of the total costs, so the State
Auditor assessed the tax on that amount. On the class 3 con-
tracts, since respondent admitted it was responsible for the tax
both as to labor and materials if it was liable at all, the tax was
based on 100 per cent of the contract cost.
Section 11408, Revised Statutes of Missouri, reads in part:
From and after the effective date of this Act, there shall be
and is hereby levied and imposed and shall be collected and
paid: (2) Upon every retail sale in this State of tangible
personal property a tax equivalent to two (2) per cent of
the purchase price paid or charged, or in case such sale
involves the exchange of property, a tax equivalent to two
(2) per cent of the consideration paid or charged, including
the fair market value of the property exchanged at the time
and place of the exchange.
And Section 11407 (g) likewise states:
'Sale at retail' means any transfer made by any person
engaged in business as defined herein of the ownership of,
or title to, tangible personal property to the purchaser, for
use or consumption and not for resale in any form as tan-
gible personal property, for a valuable consideration; . . .
Respondent contended, and the trial court agreed, that no
"sale at retail" had taken place because the respondent itself
"used and consumed" the materials in fulfilling the terms of its
1. State ex rel. Otis Elevator Go. v. Smith, 357 Mo. 1055, 212 S.W.2d 580(1948).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1950/iss3/10
COMMENTS
contracts, which specified the installation of completed elevators.
Thus respondent claimed that in carrying out the terms of the
contract, the materials were added to and became a part of the
realty, and thus lost their status as "tangible personal property."
Evidence was introduced to show that the respondent designed
and installed each individual elevator in compliance with rigid
specifications, and that no elevator would fit into a shaft other
than the one for which it was designed, even if in the same
building. 2
The Supreme Court recognized the nature of the services per-
formed by respondent as annexing the elevators so that they
became a part of the realty, but nevertheless held against respon-
dent as to the class 1 and 2 contracts because of a so-called "title-
retention clause" inserted therein. This clause reads as follows:
It is agreed that all the apparatus furnished hereunder can
be removed without material injury to the freehold, and we
[the respondent] retain title thereto until final payment in
cash is made, with the right to retake possession of the
same or any part thereof at your [the land or building
owner's] cost if default is made by you in any of the pay-
ments, irrespective of the manner of attachment to the
realty, . . 3
The Court expressly stated that, in the absence of this clause,
no tax could be levied on the sales.4 However, although agreeing
that the materials had been "used and consumed" in a sense, the
holding was that the parties had expressly agreed that the mate-
rials in the class 1 and 2 contracts came under the heading of
tangible personal property which could be removed without
damage to the freehold and hence were subject to the tax al-
though, admittedly, respondent's title was a conditional one.-
Naturally, under this reasoning the court held for respondent as
to the class 3 contracts, which were oral.
The determination that, in the absence of the title retention
2. The different specifications required for each elevator are discussed in
detail on pp. 4-5 of the first opinion written by Judge Ellison in Division 2.
3. Id. at 5.
4. State ex rel. Otis Elevator Co. v. Smith, 357 Mo. 1055, 1061, 212 S.W.2d
580, 584.
5. The court was not impressed with respondent's argument that, under
the reasoning of Mutual Acceptance Corp. v. Canole, 342 Mo. 1170, 119
S.W.2d 820, where the vendee was liable for the ad valorem property tax
on property held under a conditional sales contract, respondent could not
be taxed in the instant case. It distinguished the case, id. at 1061, 212
S.W.2d at 583.
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clause, the materials were affixed to the realty, hence used and
consumed by respondent in carrying out his contractual duties
and not taxable under the sales tax, seems in accord with the
authorities generally.6 Further, the modern view is that the
most important element in determining whether an item has
become a fixture is the intent of the parties,7 and this would
seem to fix the elevators' status as realty. The court was faced
with a Missouri decision, City of St. Louis v. Smith,8 which
would seem to put at rest the argument that, in contracts such
as these, the materials consumed can be taxed under the sales
tax. The City of St. Louis case was a suit for a declaratory
judgment in which the city asked for an adjudication as to
whether it was liable, under the sales tax law, for taxes on
materials purchased by contractor engaged in constructing
streets, sewers, and a hospital. The case held that, since there
was an inseparable commingling of labor and material, the ma-
terials became a part of the street or building, and hence the
taxable transaction was the sale from the dealer to the contrac-
tor. The case did not specifically hold that the contractor is not
liable as a seller to the landowner, but both parties in the instant
case so regarded it. 9
In reaching the result of taxability as to the materials used
in the class 1 and 2 contracts, however, the court has taken an
unusual approach to the taxation problem, and seems to have
had some difficulty with its reasoning. A careful reading of the
first opinion handed down by Division 2 (but never published)
seems to indicate little distinction between the two opinions.
6. Wood Preserving Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 235 Ala. 438, 179 So.
254 (1938); Duhame v. State Tax Commission, 65 Ariz. 268, 179 P.2d 252(1947) ; State v. J. Watts Kearny & Sons, 181 La. 554, 160 So. 77 (1934) ;
State v. Christhilf, 170 Md. 586, 185 Ati. 456 (1936); Acorn Iron Works
v. State Board of Tax Administration, 295 Mich. 143, 294 N.W. 126 (1940) ;
City of St. Louis v. Smith, 342 Mo. 317, 114 S.W.2d 1017 (1938); Albu-
querque Lumber Co. v. Bureau of Revenue, 42 N.M. 58, 75 P.2d 334 (1937) ;
Atlas Supply Co. v. Maxwell, 212 N.C. 624, 194 S.E. 117 (1937); State
Board of Equalization v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 54 Wyo. 521, 94 P.2d 147(1939). Contra: Wiseman v. Gillioz, 192 Ark. 950, 96 S.W.2d 459 (1936);
Moore v. Pleasant Hasler Construction Co., 50 Ariz. 317, 72 P.2d 573 (1937) ;
Bradley Supply Co. v. Ames, 359 Ill. 162, 194 N.E. 272 (1935); Blome v.
Ames, 365 II. 456, 6 N.E.2d 841 (1937). The cases contra seemingly have
either been overruled or can be distinguished; see Acorn Iron Works v.
State Board of Tax Administration, 295 Mich. 143, 148, 294 N.W. 126, 128
(1940).
7. Brown, Personal Property §141 (1936).
8. 342 Mo. 317, 114 S.W.2d 1017 (1938).
9. See p. 3 of the first opinion written by Judge Ellison in Division 2.
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Both rely heavily upon the five cases cited by the Auditor,10
three of which involved elevator contracts similar to these."
These cases held that, when there is a title retention clause in-
serted in such a contract, the clause is binding between the
parties and their privies, except where the removal of the mate-
rials would result in substantial physical damage to the buildings
involved. Respondent argued that the title retention clause was
a mere security title in the nature of a lien, but the court was
impressed with what it considered the unfairness of permitting
respondent to operate in such a manner as to denominate the
material personal property for security purposes, and neverthe-
less avoid the sales tax on the basis that the material was not
personal property.12 Thus the court stated:
.. if by the act of attaching them to the real estate they are
converted into realty and the title passes to the landowner
they will not be subject to the tax because it does not go
against real estate. But even though the materials be at-
tached to the real estate and in that sense be "used and con-
sumed," yet if the parties by their contract have preserved
the legal status of the materials as personalty under the
rule stated in the authorities cited .... then they are subject
to the tax, notwithstanding [sic] the Elevator Company
retained a conditional title until the contract price had been
paid in full. 3
There has been increasing recognition in recent years of the
necessity for increasing the scope of state taxation. A narrow
10. Detroit Cooperage Co. v. Sistersville Brewing Co., 233 U.S. 712(1914) ; Wheat v. Otis Elevator Co., 23 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1927) ; Woodliff
v. Citizens' Building & Realty Co., 240 Mich. 413, 215 N.W. 343 (1927);
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Farm & Home Savings & Loan Ass'n,
227 Mo.App. 832, 58 S.W.2d 338 (1933) ; Harvard Financial Corp. v. Green-
blatt Construction Co., 261 N.Y. 169, 184 N.E. 748 (1933).
11. Wheat v. Otis Elevator Co., Woodliff v. Citizens' Building & Realty
Co., Harvard Financial Corp. v. Greenblatt Construction Co., supra note 10.
12. Thus on p. 7 of the first opinion written by Judge Ellison in Division
2, the court, after pointing out that the Auditor's authorities involved the
"instant relator," stated that the Auditor's contention was that .. . . the
relator Elevator Company here is blowing both hot and cold in seeking
refuge behind the St. Louis Case, first reviewed herein, on the theory that
the materials entering into the construction of its elevators and escalators
are "used and consumed"; whereas, on the other hand, it bases its right
to remove them on the fact that it sells them under a conditional sales con-
tract in which it retains title and stipulates that they can be removed with-
out material injury to the freehold. But is it not true thhat, in many
areas of the law of sales, title to the same personal property is in different
parties for different purposes?
13. State ex rel. Otis Elevator Co. v. Smith, 357 Mo. 1055, 1060, 212
S.W.2d 580, 583 (1948).
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interpretation of the commerce clause of the United States Con-
stitution by the United States Supreme Court has consistently
prevented the state from obtaining much-needed revenues.1
There is, then, a forceful argument which can be made in favor
of adopting a pragmatic view of state tax measures." Although
such a view was not articulated in the instant case, it may serve
as a justification of the Missouri court's position. Nevertheless,
it is submitted that the court has reached an unfortunate result.
Following the rationale of the Missouri court the taxability of
transactions of this nature will depend upon whether or not
security title has been retained. This would hardly seem a valid
basis for imposing a sales tax. This means that, in the future,
contractors and assemblers will take other measures to obtain
the desired security. Thus there is no long-range solution to the
state revenue problem, and the argument which supports the
decision, based upon a pragmatic view of state taxation mea-
sures, loses much of its validity. It is unreal to make the deter-
mination of whether the building owner is the ultimate consumer
of the materials involved turn upon a contract stipulation as to
the sit= of title; this is especially true where the statement as
to title is inserted for security purposes. The majority view that
materials to be consumed by a contractor are not sold at retail
to the building owner within the meaning of the sales tax laws
would seem to be a salutary one; to call this a sale of tangible
personal property is to be guilty of the "lump concept thinking"
which has so often troubled courts in other fields of the law.
If the legislature wishes to place a tax upon the contractor and
to treat him as a vendor in order to plug what might seem to be
a void in the general-tax scheme, it is free to do so. In the mean-
while, it would seem unwise of the court to seize upon the ques-
tion of title for security purposes, and do violence to established
concepts in the law of taxation of fixtures, in order to bring the
materials within the Missouri sales tax. As one critic has already
stated:
14. For an exposition of this theory, and an interesting solution to it,
see Hellerstein and Hennefeld, State Taxation in a National Economy, 54
Harv. L. Rev. 949 (1941).
15. The pragmatic approach seems to have captured the field of federal
taxation. For a discussion of this in relation to the oft-discussed Helvering
v. Halleck, 309 U.S. 106 (1940), see Oliver, Property Rationalism and Tax
Pragmatism, 20 Tax. L. REV. 675 (1942).
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This is a good example of the uncritical application of gen-
eral legal doctrine to a tax case. The recitals in the contract
as to the removability of the elevators and equipment and as
to title were inserted for security reasons. They have no
bearing whatever on the determination as to whether the
taxpayer is to be treated, for retail sales tax purposes, as the
consumer of the cages, cables, shafts, etc. which go into an
elevator installation . . . whatever the solution to be
reached, it should not be determined by the niceties of the
law of the title.16
CHARLES C. ALLEN III
TORTS-LIABILITY OF RESTAURANT OWNER FOR DEATH RE-
SULTING FROM EATING POISONED FOOD UNDER WRONGFUL DEATH
STATUTE--QUANTUM OF PROOF. Plaintiff and her husband be-
came ill two hours after eating a meal of corned beef in the
defendant-restaurant. Plaintiff brought suit against the res-
taurant under the Mississippi wrongful death statute for the
death of her husband, who died of ptomaine poisoning eight days
after eating the corned beef. The trial judge directed a verdict
for the defendant after the close of the plaintiff's evidence. The
Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the judgement of the trial
court, ruling that the plaintiff did not prove a prima facie case of
negligence for submission to a jury. The court said that the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur4 could not be applied to food bacteria
cases, and that there was no evidence from which a jury could
find that the defendant was negligent in preparing the food, or
that the defendant's negligence caused the death of the plaintiff's
husband. The court further held that there could be no recovery
on the basis of a breach of an implied warranty because the war-
ranty did not survive to the wife upon the death of her husband.1
There are two theories upon which recovery for injury caused
by the presence of a deleterious substance in food may be based:
(1) negligence on the part of the dispenser of the food,2 and (2)
breach of an implied warranty.3 Recovery, of course, may always
be had if the plaintiff is able to prove negligence, but because of
16. Hellerstein, State and Local Taxation, 1947 ANNUAL SURVEY OF
AMERICAN LAw 321 (1948).
1. Goodwin v. Misticos et aL, 42 So.2d. 397 (Miss. 1949).
2. Note, 7 A.L.R.2d 1027 (1949).
3. Ibid.
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